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Abstract
Can the same mathematical control laws that smooth out oscillations in the ight of an
airplane also moderate economic cycles of boom and bust? Attempts to bring together the
intellectual traditions of control engineering and economics go back at least as far as the
hydraulic analog computer of A. W. H. Phillips, circa 1950. Today, economic policymakers
remain committed to the ideal of controlling business cycles; it remains an open question
whether tools from control theory might help to rene their strategies.1
1 Engineering the Economy
In November 1949, faculty, students and guests at the London School of Economics
gathered to observe a demonstration. At the front of the room was a two-meter-
tall contraption assembled out of transparent plastic pipes, tanks, valves and other
plumbing hardware. The device, later dubbed the moniac, was a hydraulic analog
computer for modeling the ow of money through a national economy. When the
machine was powered up, colored water gurgled through the tubes and sloshed into
reservoirs. Various streams represented consumption, investment, taxes, savings,
imports and exports. Crank-wheels and adjustable cams and weirs allowed the
water levels and ows to be regulated|the hydraulic equivalent of setting monetary
and scal policies. This was real trickle-down economics!
The principal architect|and plumber|of the moniac was A. W. H. Phillips, a
New Zealander who had been an electrical engineer before he launched a new career
in the social sciences and economics; at the time of the 1949 debut of the moniac he
was a Ph.D. candidate in economics (Leeson 2000, Bissell 2007). Very likely it was
Phillips's engineering background that led him to choose such a mechanistic way
of illustrating economic principles. The hydraulic simulation emphasizes that the
circulation of money through a society obeys deterministic, mathematical laws, like
those that govern uids and other physical systems. And the crank-wheels and cams
on the moniac imply that the behavior of an economy is not only predictable but
also controllable. If we twiddle the knobs and nudge the levers in just the right way,
1This article is based in part on an essay published in American Scientist as (Hayes 2009). Another
version was presented as a talk at the conference Celebrating the 60th Anniversary of the Phillips Na-
tional Income Electro-Hydraulic Analogue Machine, held at the University of Trento in December 2010.
Conversations with the organizers and participants in that conference inspired substantial revisions, but
the views expressed herein remain the authors' own.
1all the streams will ow smoothly and the various basins where wealth accumulates
will never run dry or overow.
In later publications, Phillips made the engineering context of his economic ideas
more explicit (Phillips 1954, 1957). He interpreted the Keynesian methodology for
moderating business cycles as an exercise in control theory, the branch of engineering
and applied mathematics concerned with feedback systems. Thus unwanted uctu-
ations in economic activity were to be brought under control by the same kinds of
techniques that smooth out oscillations in the ight of an airplane or regulate the
operation of a petroleum renery.
A number of others also took up the notion of applying control theory to eco-
nomic problems. Arnold Tustin, an engineer and control theorist at the Univer-
sity of Birmingham, had published a book on the theme in 1953 (Tustin 1953).
A decade later the control theorists David Livesey of Cambridge University and
Robert Pindyck of M.I.T. began working on macroeconomic problems. There were
crossovers in the other direction as well: In 1968 half a dozen graduate students and
young faculty members in the economics department at Harvard University enrolled
in a control-theory course taught by Arthur Bryson (Athans and Kendrick 1974,
Kendrick 2005); two of those economists, Lance Taylor and David Kendrick, sub-
sequently published a macroeconomic development model based on control-theory
methods. By the 1970s control theorists and economists were coming together in
joint workshops and conferences, and even the U.S. Federal Reserve announced that
it was testing control-theory methods in setting monetary policy.
The budding romance between control theory and economics did not last long, for
reasons I shall mention below. On the other hand, eorts to assert control over the
wilder excursions of business cycles certainly have not ended. In the aftermath of the
nancial crisis of 2008, governments and central banks enacted stimulus programs of
staggering magnitude, using every available instrument of monetary and scal policy
to spur production and consumption. As a society, it seems we are committed to
the idea that cycles of boom and bust are subject to control. The question I raise
here is whether those eorts at control might be more eective if they were informed
by a theoretical infrastructure in which elements of control theory and engineering
would have a place.
The author of this essay is neither a control theorist nor an economist but a
student and observer of both elds. Like many others, I have taken note of close par-
allels between the basic principles of control theory and those of Keynesian macro-
economics (Hayes 1989, 2009). And I have wondered why control methods have not
proved more useful at the practical level in setting macroeconomic policies. What
follows should be regarded as the record of an ongoing personal inquiry into this
question rather than an attempt to formulate a denitive answer.
2 Feedback in Machines and Markets
Control theory and economics have their roots in the same time and place: the early
stirrings of the Industrial Revolution in 18th-century Britain.
The centrifugal yball governor for steam engines, invented by James Watt in
1788, is the iconic control device, often serving as an emblem for the entire eld of
control engineering. Two heavy balls are attached by a hinge-like linkage to a shaft
that rotates with the main power shaft of the engine; another lever arm connects
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and hence y outward; this change in conguration is communicated to the steam
throttle valve, closing it slightly and thereby reducing the engine speed. Likewise, if
the engine slows, the governor opens the valve, and the higher steam ow restores the
machine to its set-point speed. Through this \feedback" mechanism the governor
maintains a constant operating speed even as the load on the engine varies.
Watt's governor was by no means the rst application of the feedback principle
to a mechanical device; there were precedents in antiquity, and Watt himself was
probably inspired by innovations in the design of windmills. But Watt's adoption of
the idea brought wide attention to the idea of feedback control and led to a owering
of other applications (Mayr 1970).
Feedback also had an essential role in the greatest landmark of the classical eco-
nomics literature, Adam Smith's Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations, published in 1776. According to Otto Mayr, at least three key mecha-
nisms in Smith's account of economic aairs can be described in terms of feedback
loops (Mayr 1971).
First, Smith introduced a feedback loop regulating the overall size of the laboring
population:
The demand for men, like that for any other commodity, necessarily
regulates the production of men; quickens it when it goes on too slowly,
and stops it when it advances too fast. (Smith 1776, p. 80)
(The mechanism by which the working-class population is to be regulated should
not be passed over in silence: Smith posited a linkage between wage levels and the
rate of infant mortality.)
Second, Smith invoked a more elaborate feedback process for allocating labor
resources to various trades:
If in the same neighbourhood, there was any employment evidently either
more or less advantageous than the rest, so many people would crowd
into it in the one case, and so many would desert it in the other, that its
advantages would soon return to the level of other employments. (Smith
1776, p. 99)
And nally there is Smith's grand conception of the market mechanism|the law
of supply and demand|which can also be cast in the form of a feedback loop:
The market price of every particular commodity is regulated by the pro-
portion between the quantity which is actually brought to market, and
the demand of those who are willing to pay the natural price of the
commodity. (Smith 1776, p. 56)
In the subsequent paragraphs Smith makes clear that price is both a dependent vari-
able and an independent variable in this relation. That is to say, price is determined
by the ratio of supply to demand, but at the same time both supply and demand
are dependent on price. Circularities of this kind are unavoidable in closed feedback
systems.
Watt and Smith were contemporaries and Scottish compatriots, and at least one
source suggests they were also friends, though of dierent social stations. During
the period when Smith was professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glas-
gow, Watt opened an instrument-making shop on the university grounds. Smith's
319th-century biographer, John Rae, reports that: \Watt's workshop was a favourite
resort of Smith's during his residence at Glasgow College, for Watt's conversation,
young though he was, was fresh and original, and had great attractions for the
stronger spirits about him. Watt on his side retained always the deepest respect for
Smith.... " (Rae 1895, p. 74). Whether feedback systems ever came up as a topic
of conversation remains a fascinating but probably unanswerable question.
3 The Keynesian Program
The feedback loops in Smith's Wealth of Nations dier in a subtle but important way
from those of Watt's apparatus for controlling steam engines. The Watt governor
compares the actual speed of the engine with a desired or commanded speed, the
\set point," and makes corrections to the actual speed to bring it into closer accord
with the set point. But there is nothing resembling a set point in Smith's classical
vision of market economics. A feedback process guides buyers and sellers toward
an equilibrium price, but there is no knob or dial for setting a desired target price.
Nor is there any way to control the aggregate production of sellers or the aggregate
demand of buyers.
One hundred sixty years later John Maynard Keynes argued for the addition of
just such controlling knobs and dials to the macroeconomic machinery. The aim was
not to intervene in the market process that sets prices or production priorities; those
details were to be left to Smith's feedback loops. But Keynes held that merely ensur-
ing an equilibrium between production and consumption did not in fact guarantee
economic well-being. A depressed economy, with a low rate of production balancing
an equally low rate of consumption, is clearly in equilibrium. But almost everyone
would prefer a dierent equilibrium, with both production and consumption closer
to their maximum sustainable levels.
These ideas were put forward in the context of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
Keynes's agenda was to provide tools for mitigating such cyclical uctuations in
business activity. Under the Keynes prescription, when an economy is growing at
an unsustainable pace, leading to excessive ination, the central bank raises interest
rates and thereby restricts the money supply. At the same time, governments raise
taxes or reduce spending, which also cools the economy. Conversely, when business
slumps, the aim is to spur growth by lowering interest rates and by letting the
government run a decit, spending more than it takes in through taxes.
Keynes's ideas have gone in and out of fashion, and they remain a subject for
continual debate and reinterpretation among dozens of disputatious factions within
the world of professional and academic economics. Out in the real-world economy,
however, that debate is large beside the point. Leaders of governments and central
banks nd it a political necessity to respond actively to any severe or prolonged
unfavorable economic circumstances. The tools available for such interventions tend
to have a Keynesian avor, whatever the avowed ideology of the party putting them
to work. As Milton Friedman and Richard Nixon are said to have said, \We're
all Keynesians now" (Reich 2010, p. 44). In the U.S., the 2008 economic crisis
arrived at a moment of transition between two regimes grounded in quite dierent
political and economic philosophies. But the outgoing and the incoming adminis-
trations adopted very similar strategies (both monetary and scal) for dealing with
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dence that stimulus plans would reinvigorate a
swooning economy.
Reliance on these policies would seem to imply an underlying faith in the basic
proposition that an economy is subject to control, at least in principle, and that
we have adequate means to maintain control over it. These are just the kinds of
assumptions that the engineering discipline of control theory is equipped to test.
4 Everything is Under Control
On rst acquaintance, the idea of feedback control seems straightforward enough
( Astr om and Murray 2008). Consider the design of a cruise-control system for an
automobile, designed to keep the car moving at constant speed.
A zeroth-order version of such a device simply clamps the throttle valve (or the
gas pedal) at a xed position. This is an \open loop" controller, and it doesn't
perform very well. The car slows as soon as it begins climbing an upgrade, and
speeds up on every downhill.
The simplest closed-loop controller measures the instantaneous speed of the car,
compares it with the desired speed, then adjusts the throttle by an amount propor-
tional to the dierence (taking proper care that the sign of the correction acts to
reduce the error). If the car slows somewhat on an upgrade, the controller senses
the discrepancy and opens the throttle wider, so that the car regains some of the
lost speed.
A drawback of pure proportional control is that the car never quite attains the
requested speed; as the error diminishes, so does the feedback signal, and the system
settles into a state with some nonzero oset from the correct velocity. The oset
can be eliminated by another form of feedback, based not on the error itself but
on the integral of the error with respect to time. In eect, the integral measures
the cumulative error, which keeps growing if the speed diers even slightly from
the set point. Thus integral control ensures that over the long term the net error
approaches zero and the average speed converges on the set-point speed.
Yet integral control has drawbacks of its own. Suppose the car lacks the power
to maintain a commanded speed on an upgrade, even with the throttle wide open;
an integral controller would compensate by going faster than the commanded speed
on the next downhill, which is probably not desirable behavior. More generally,
integral control has a tendency to overshoot and oscillate around the set point. A
remedy is to add still another form of feedback, based on the time derivative of the
error signal. Derivative feedback opposes rapid changes in speed and thus tends to
damp out oscillations.
Proportional, integral and derivative control (together known as PID) are the ba-
sic tools of \classical" control theory. The mathematical apparatus supporting these
methods was developed in the 1920s and 30s, most notably at Bell Telephone Labo-
ratories, where the objective was to build low-distortion ampliers for long-distance
speech transmission (Bode 1960). The Bell workers (including Harry Nyquist, Harry
S. Black and Hendrick W. Bode) developed frequency-domain methods for designing
feedback controllers and for evaluating their performance and stability.
Stability is a vital issue. In many instances the system to be brought under
control|usually called the \plant," whether it is an oil renery, an airplane or a
stock market|is inherently unstable when observed in isolation. Most aircraft, for
5example, have a pitch-axis instability known as porpoising or phugoid oscillation,
in which the airplane alternately dives and ascends, trading airspeed for altitude,
kinetic for potential energy. A PID controller can damp out those oscillations. But
it's also possible for a controller to introduce instabilities to a plant that would be
stable on its own.
The hazard of controller-induced instability is most acute when there are delays
built into the feedback circuit. The nature of this problem is familiar in everyday
life. You step into the shower and nd that the water is too cool, so you twist the
temperature-control valve counterclockwise. Nothing happens for a few seconds,
and so you turn the valve a little more. When the hot water nally makes its way to
the shower head, you nd you've gone too far. You dial the valve back a little, but
the water continues to get hotter, so you turn the control further clockwise. Soon
you're shivering. The temperature oscillations can keep growing in amplitude until
the shower is alternately emitting the hottest and the coldest water available.
An analysis of this behavior based on the frequency-domain methods of Nyquist
and Bode would show that the controller has too much gain at high frequencies.
The built-in lag in the response of the plant puts constraints on the performance
of the controller. Unfortunately, similar lags are likely to be present in economic
systems as well.
5 Modern Control Theory
Labeling something \classical"|whether in music, physics, economics or control
theory|carries the suggestion that some newer and spier version has superseded
it. In the case of control theory there is indeed a \modern" variant, developed
mainly since the 1960s (Doyle et al. 1992).
Modern control theory favors time-domain analysis over the frequency-domain
design methods of classical theory. In other words, the aim is to directly trace the
evolution of the state of a dynamical system as a function of time, rather than
studying the response of the system to cyclical signals of various frequencies. Time-
domain methods can more readily handle multiple inputs and multiple outputs. For
example, with the classical approach it's easy to create separate controllers for an
aircraft's roll, pitch and yaw axes, but harder to account for coupling between the
axes; modern methods yield a unied control law for all three axes.
There have been other innovations. Classical control theory is framed in terms
of dierential equations with continuous variables and continuous time; the modern
theory can handle dierence equations with variables that take discrete values and
evolve in discrete time steps. Tools of computational optimization have been intro-
duced to search for the best control law within some universe of candidates. And
there are methods for coping with various kinds of uncertainty. Stochastic control
tolerates noise or errors in the measurements of the system's state. Robust control
nds laws that deliver reasonable performance even if the real system diers some-
what from the mathematical model that represents it. Adaptive control applies the
feedback principle to the control laws themselves, allowing the controller to continue
working as the system evolves.
The new techniques have transformed the practice of control engineering, but
what has changed most is the process an engineer follows in designing a control
system; at a deeper level, the operation of the controller itself is much the same.
6\Under the hood," it's still about feedback loops|comparing the observed state
of the system (present, past and predicted) with the desired state, and calculating
appropriate corrections.
The entire apparatus of modern control theory stands at the ready for any
economist who might want to apply it to problems in macroeconomics. In the
brief owering of such experiments in the 1960s and 70s there was particular inter-
est in optimal control, and attention later turned to stochastic control. Yet the most
pressing questions about control-theoretic methods in macroeconomics are at such a
basic level that the choice between classical and modern design methodologies is al-
most beside the point. When one tries to translate the problem of stabilizing global
business cycles into the language of control engineering, three fundamental questions
come up immediately. First, what are the process variables, and do we have sensors
that can measure them reliably? Second, what are the control variables, and do we
have actuators that can manipulate them eectively? And, nally, do the dynamics
of the system|most notably the delay between input and response|admit a stable
control solution?
6 Economic Sensors and Actuators
In designing a control system for an economy, the rst step is to identify economic
equivalents of engineering concepts such as sensors and actuators. The sensors are
meant to measure levels of economic activity, such as employment and savings rates,
income, spending, imports, exports and dozens of other variables. The actuators in
a Keynesian program are monetary and scal policies. Through monetary policy
a central bank controls the supply of money (mainly by regulating the terms of
credit). Fiscal policy is usually summarized as the balance between government
revenues and expenditures, although in fact tax and spending policies often include
many kinds of incentives and disincentives for particular kinds of economic activity.
On the sensor side, the number that most often serves as a proxy for overall
economic health is gross domestic product (GDP). This measure (or its predecessor
GNP) was in fact developed in the context of the original Keynesian program in the
1930s, mainly by Richard Stone in the U.K. and by Simon Kuznets in the U.S. As
an indicator of general economic welfare it is subject to many criticisms| failure to
capture certain sectors of economic activity such as unpaid work and indierence to
wealth distribution|but as a candidate for a process variable in a control system the
main failing of GDP is timeliness. In the U.S., the framework for GDP calculation
is built on an economic census conducted at intervals of ve years, supplemented by
various monthly, quarterly and annual data sources (Landefeld et al. 2008). Final
quarterly estimates of GDP are released three months after a quarter ends (and the
gures are still subject to further revision, up to two years later). Thus if we choose
to adopt GDP as the process variable for a control algorithm, we must cope with a
time lag of at least three to six months.
With the spread of electronic commerce and communication networks, vast quan-
tities of economic data are becoming available in close to real time. Banking and re-
tail credit transactions are processed in seconds; stock-market trades can be tracked
with millisecond precision. Unfortunately, non-monetary ows and stocks|such as
inventory levels|cannot be gauged as quickly. Still, with enough eort perhaps it
7will be possible to devise some trustworthy measure of overall economic wellbeing
that can be computed with a delay of days or weeks rather than months or years.
On the actuator side of the control process, monetary policy is typically revised
every month or two, and there is no fundamental reason it could not be updated
more frequently if the need arose. Fiscal policy is another matter. Tax codes and
many kinds of government spending are captives of an annual budget process, which
is intensely politicized. After an economic upset, reaching agreement on the need
for corrective action can take months, with more months to negotiate the nature
and magnitude of the response, and still more months before the eects of any
legislation lter through to the public. Furthermore, the entire process is driven
more by political imperatives than by a scientic assessment of economic needs.
The one branch of scal policy that responds promptly to economic events con-
sists of entitlement payments such as unemployment compensation, which are trig-
gered automatically, without the need for legislative intervention. Such \social safety
net" mechanisms presumably do help to damp business-cycle oscillations, but from
a control-theory perspective their inexible, automatic character eliminates them as
tools for imposing active control. From this point of view they are really part of the
plant|the system to be controlled|rather than part of the controller.
7 Running Hot and Cold
Given the delays in both sensing and responding to economic events, the character-
istic time scale for a macroeconomic feedback control loop would appear to be at
least a year, and possibly longer. (This is the time required for a signal to make
a full circuit of the loop: from the moment the controller rst detects a departure
from desired behavior, then calculates and applies a corrective action, until it nally
detects the rst eects of the correction.) A feedback system with such extended
delays gives rise to worries about controller-induced instability|about the risk of
being alternately scalded and frozen in the shower.
Phillips explored this issue with great care in his 1957 paper on \stablisation
policy and the time-forms of lagged responses." This work was based on simulations
run on electronic and electromechanical analog computers at the National Physical
Laboratory and at the aviation rm Short Brothers and Harland. (The machines
were conceptually similar to the hydraulic moniac, but faster, more versatile and
more accurate.) In his analysis, Phillips distinguished between \lags," in which
a control action begins immediately but takes eect gradually over an interval of
time, and \delays," in which the action does not even begin to make itself felt until
the end of the interval. His strategy was to set up a model with specied lags
and delays, then search for controller parameters|gains for proportional, integral
and derivative feedback loops|that would most eectively stabilize the economy.
He found that both lags and delays could make the simulated economy harder to
control, but delays had particularly disastrous consequences. In some cases, with
delays of six months, no combination of PID coecients could suppress the growth
of undamped oscillations. Worse still, the unwanted oscillations were introduced by
the action of the controller itself; they appeared even when the underlying economic
model had no tendency to generate business cycles.
The result of Phillips's experiment could be taken as a sobering lesson and warn-
ing, given that the lags and delays involved in recent eorts to stabilize business
8cycles lie deep in the danger zone that Phillips identied, out beyond the six month
threshold. At this moment, banks and governments might be trying to stimulate a
sluggish economy when it is already on the verge of overheating. Then in the next
phase of the cycle, they could react too late again and douse the smoldering ruins
of an economy that by then would need renewed kindling.
In early 2009, thoughts along these lines led me to revive a longstanding personal
interest in the connections between control theory and economics, and then to write
the essay that appeared as (Hayes 2009). Looking back from two years later, the
hazard of controller-induced oscillations has not gone away; on the other hand,
there is no convincing evidence of such overshooting or instability. If anything, the
economic predicament of many nations suggests an excess of stability: The stimulus
programs enacted in 2008 and 2009 amounted to the largest deliberate economic
intervention in history, and yet they have had little impact on unemployment or
other measures of malaise.
This stubborn resistance suggests still another question: Could it be that gov-
ernments and central banks lack the capacity to tame the business cycle? No cruise-
control algorithm can keep a car up to speed if the engine cannot produce the torque
needed to climb a hill. Likewise, agencies trying to correct a severe economic down-
turn may lack the resources to restore prosperity. It is a measure of our profound
ignorance about the true present state of the economy that two diametrically oppo-
site explanations|over- and under-correction|can plausibly be entertained at the
same time.
8 Second Guessing
When economic applications of control theory fell from fashion in the later 1970s and
1980s, it was not because of any dramatic controller-induced instabilities like those
that worried Phillips in 1957. In fact most of the attempts to apply optimal control
theory in economics never got as far as examining closed-loop systems; they merely
used optimization procedures to shape policy trajectories in an open-loop context.
Under those circumstances, runaway out-of-phase feedback is not a concern.
One major cause of disillusionment was a critique published in 1976 by Robert E.
Lucas, Jr., of the University of Chicago (Lucas 1976). Lucas argued that using any
algorithm or mathematical model as a tool for setting economic policy was futile.
Models, he said, predict the eect of policy changes without acknowledging that
rational agents will alter their behavior under the new policies in ways that invalidate
the assumptions on which the models were built. For example, if everyone knows
(or can infer) the rule by which the Federal Reserve sets interest rates, borrowers
and lenders will anticipate any changes in rates, adjusting their behavior in ways
that tend to neutralize the eect of the policy change.
David Kendrick (2005) has described the eect of the Lucas critique on control
theory in economics: \[W]ork on control theory models in general and stochastic
control models in particular went into rapid decline and remained that way for a
substantial time." This outcome is curious, because the Lucas critique doesn't really
address the mechanism of feedback control, much less prove its futility. The critique
describes only half of a feedback loop: The plant (represented by the agent with
rational expectations) gets to react to the strategy of the controller, but the loop is
never closed so that the controller can react in turn to the moves made by the plant.
9The control strategy is assumed to be static, or at least always a time step behind
the plant. A true closed-loop system has symmetrical dynamics, where the state of
the plant and the controller continually co-evolve.
If the Lucas critique is to be taken seriously, it attacks not just control theory
and mathematical modeling but any reasoned strategy for managing an economy|
or a corporation, or a nation. Given the hypothesis that any predictable policy will
always be undermined by a determined adversary, the only eective rulers would be
those who are utterly capricious. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise.
Evidence also suggests that real-world economic agents are not as strongly moti-
vated to \game the system" as Lucas supposed. Ray C. Fair of Yale University, using
a model of the U.S. economy based on decades of empirical data, tested variations of
the model in which agents could look ahead and base their behavior on predictions
of future regulatory policies. The results suggest that such activity is not common
in the real economy (Fair 2004). Another series of studies by Glenn D. Rudebusch of
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco reached a similar conclusion (Rudebusch
2002).
9 Taking Control
With or without the aid of control theory, governments will continue to make their
best eorts to ameliorate the suering caused by business cycles. Doing so is a
humanitarian as well as a political necessity. One might imagine a leader who would
stand aside and say: "I have no idea what's the matter with the economy, and
since I don't know how to x it, I'm going to keep my mitts o it." That would be
refreshingly honest, but inexcusable all the same.
Informal feedback principles have probably helped to frame some of the counter-
cyclical policies of recent years. In 1993 John B. Taylor of Stanford University
proposed mathematical rules for setting central-bank interest rates in response to
ination and economic growth|rules that have almost surely inuenced policy deci-
sions over the past decade (Taylor 1993). The Taylor rules constitute a rudimentary
feedback mechanism. On the other hand, they do not exploit the full power of con-
trol theory. Taylor's formulas ignore the question of controller-induced instability,
and they take no account of the uncertainties that enter into stochastic and robust
control methods.
Needless to say, the cost of miscalculation is high. Ben S. Bernanke, a student of
the Great Depression, has argued that timid and misguided policies of the Federal
Reserve were partly to blame for the length and severity of the 1930s depression in
the U.S. (Bernanke 2004). (As chairman of the Fed, Bernanke has presided over
a monetary response that is anything but timid.) On the other side the fence,
Athanasios Orphanides, also of the Federal Reserve, has argued that overaggressive
corrections in the 1970s contributed to the \stagation" of that decade (Orphanides
and Williams 2005). And still another faction questions whether monetary adjust-
ments really have much eect at all. Through an ingenious computer simulation,
Christopher A. Sims of Yale imposed the policies of the modern Fed on the economy
of the 1930s, and vice versa. Swapping the strategies had little eect on the outcome
(Sims 1998).
In a matter of such grave consequence it's unnerving to nd so little consensus
on basic principles. If the designers of an airplane disagreed so vehemently about
10the engineering of the ight-control system, the airplane would not leave the ground
until the conict had been resolved. But the design methodology and the engineering
culture for aviation systems is quite dierent from that of economics. In control
theory there is an unshakeable reliance not just on science and mathematics but at
an even deeper level on cause and eect. The airplane controller may have to cope
with model uncertainties and noisy measurements, and yet at the root of the system
is a deterministic kernel for which the same input always yields the same output.
Some level of predictability and repeatability in patterns of stimulus and response
is a prerequisite for understanding and controlling one's environment. Have we yet
reached that level in economic policy?
At the very beginning of the Great Depression, Keynes wrote essay that struggles
bravely but vainly to maintain a chin-up message (Keynes 1930):
This is a nightmare, which will pass away with the morning. For the
resources of nature and men's devices are just as fertile and productive
as they were. The rate of our progress towards solving the material prob-
lems of life is not less rapid. We are as capable as before of aording for
everyone a high standard of life.... But to-day we have involved ourselves
in a colossal muddle, having blundered in the control of a delicate ma-
chine, the working of which we do not understand. The result is that our
possibilities of wealth may run to waste for a time|perhaps for a long
time.
The best I can oer by way of a cheerful response is to suggest that it's not too late
to come to an understanding of that delicate machine.
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provided perfectly calibrated measures of enthusiastic support and uncompromising
intellectual engagement.
References
[ Astr om and Murray 2008]  Astr om, Karl Johan, and Richard M. Murray. 2008.
Feedback Systems: An Introduction for Scientists and Engineers. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
[Athans and Kendrick 1974] Athans, Michael, and David Kendrick. 1974. Control
theory and economics: A survey, forecast, and speculations. IEEE Transactions
on Automatic Control 19:518{524.
11[Barr 2000] Barr, Nicholas. 2000. The history of the Phillips machine. In Leeson
2000, pp. 89{114.
[Bernanke 2004] Bernanke, Ben S. 2004. Essays on the Great Depression. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
[Bissell 2007] Bissell, Chris. 2007. Historical perspectives: The Moniac: A hy-
dromechanical analog computer of the 1950s. IEEE Control Systems Magazine
27(1):69{74.
[Bode 1960] Bode, H. W. 1960. Feedback: The history of an idea. In Symposium
on Active Networks and Feedback Systems, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn,
1960. Reprinted in Selected Papers on Mathematical Trends in Control Theory
(R. E. Bellman and R. Kalaba, eds.), New York: Dover, 1964.
[Doyle et al. 1992] Doyle, John C., Bruce A. Francis and Allen R. Tannenbaum.
1992. Feedback Control Theory. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.
[Fair 2004] Fair, Ray C. 2004. Estimating How the Macroeconomy Works. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. See also http://fairmodel.econ.
yale.edu/main2.htm
[Fair 2010] Fair, Ray C. 2010. Estimated macroeconomic eects of the U.S. stimulus
bill. Contemporary Economic Policy 28:439452.
[Hayes 1989] Hayes, Brian. 1989. Everything is under control. Scientic
Honeyweller 10(1):4{5. See http://bit-player.org/bph-publications/
SciHon-1989-Hayes-control.pdf
[Hayes 2009] Hayes, Brian. 2009. Everything is under control. American Sci-
entist 97(3):186{191. See http://amsciadmin.eresources.com/libraries/
documents/2009491133257238-2009-05Hayes.pdf
[Kendrick 1988] Kendrick, David A. 1988. Feedback: A New Framework for Macro-
economic Policy. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[Kendrick 2005] Kendrick, David Andrew. 2005. Stochastic control for economic
models: Past, present and the paths ahead. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control 29:3{30.
[Keynes 1930] Keynes, John Maynard. 1930. The great slump of 1930. The Nation
& Athenum, December 20 and December 27, 1930.
[Landefeld et al. 2008] Landefeld, J. Steven, Eugene P. Seskin and Barbara M. Frau-
meni. 2008. Taking the pulse of the economy: Measuring GDP. Journal of
Economic Perspectives 22(2):193{216.
[Leeson 2000] Leeson, Robert (editor). 2000. A. W. H. Phillips: Collected Works in
Contemporary Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[Lucas 1976] Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1976. Econometric policy evaluation: A critique.
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 1, pp. 19{46.
[Mayr 1970] Mayr, Otto. 1970. The Origins of Feedback Control. Cambridge, Mass.:
M.I.T. Press.
[Mayr 1971] Mayr, Otto. 1971. Adam Smith and the concept of the feedback sys-
tem: Economic thought and technology in 18th-century Britain. Technology
and Culture 12(1):1{22.
12[Orphanides and Williams 2005] Orphanides, Athanasios, and John C. Williams.
2005. The decline of activist stabilization policy: Natural rate mispercep-
tions, learning, and expectations. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
29:1927{1950.
[Phillips 1954] Phillips, A. W. 1954. Stabilisation policy in a closed economy. The
Economic Journal 64(254):290{323. Reprinted in Leeson 2000.
[Phillips 1957] Phillips, A. W. 1957. Stabilisation policy and the time-forms of
lagged responses. The Economic Journal 67(266):265{277. Reprinted in Lee-
son 2000.
[Rae 1895] Rae, John. 1895. Life of Adam Smith. London: Macmillan and Co.
[Reich 2010] Reich, Robert B. 2010. Aftershock: The Next Economy and Americas
Future. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
[Rudebusch 2002] Rudebusch, Glenn D. 2002. Assessing the Lucas critique in mon-
etary policy models. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Pa-
per 2002{02. See http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/
2002/wp02-02bk.pdf
[Sims 1998] Sims, Christopher A. 1998. The role of interest rate policy in the gen-
eration and propagation of business cycles: What has changed since the '30s?
In Beyond Shocks: What Causes Business Cycles?, edited by Jerey C. Fuhrer
and Scott Schuh. Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference Series
No. 42.
[Smith 1776] Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations. Edited by Edwin Cannon, based on the 1798 fth edition.
London: Methuen & Co., 1904.
[Taylor 1993] Taylor, John B. 1993. Discretion versus policy rules in practice.
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 39, pp. 195{214.
[Tustin 1953] Tustin, Arnold. 1953. The Mechanism of Economic Systems: An Ap-
proach to the Problem of Economic Stabilization from the Point of View of
Control-System Engineering. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
13